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Abstract
This review paper examines some of the main theoretical influences 
prompting a reappreciation of the importance of the body and how 
it may be conceived as relevant to information studies (IS). It starts 
by placing this increased recognition of the body in its historical and 
social context. It then examines, in turn, how the body is viewed in 
the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty; practice theory; embodied 
cognition; and sensory studies. Existing and potential influences in 
information studies are discussed. Most work that reexamines the 
place of the body reflects the influence of Merleau-Ponty, but he has 
had relatively little direct impact on IS. Practice theory does deal 
with the body, and this has already been picked up quite strongly 
in IS. Work in the area of embodied cognition has the potential to 
fundamentally change our view of the relation of the mind and the 
body, and information as an aspect of that relation. Sensory studies 
offers a powerful framework for examining the cultural shaping of 
the senses as a source of information. The implications of the bodily 
turn for methodology are briefly discussed.
The Bodily and Sensory Turns
In the 1980s and 1990s in a number of academic disciplines, such as sociol-
ogy, geography, history, and anthropology, it began to be recognized that 
the body had been neglected and undertheorized (Shilling 2007; Pink 
2015; Howes 2013b). This neglect seemed to reflect the longstanding Car-
tesian mind-body dualism in Western culture that privileges thought over 
the supposedly separate and lower functions of the body. Such a deprecia-
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tion of the body must also reflect the influence of strands in Christianity 
that tend to view the body as base and sinful. These assumptions could 
also be seen as shaping the way that in information studies (IS) we have 
generally privileged textual information and rationalistic approaches to 
gathering and using information (Lloyd 2010).
As these assumptions came under challenge socially and intellectually 
during the twentieth century, scholars in a number of subjects began to 
re-evaluate the importance of the body in their field. Yet to date, such a 
re-evaluation has only been reflected in a rather limited way in IS (Lloyd 
2010; Cox, Griffin, and Hartel 2017). This is not altogether surprising 
given IS’s starting point in the study of library users and the information 
behavior of academics and scientists and its deep engagement with the 
study of the supposedly disembodied “virtual” experiences of the internet. 
But as we enter a postdigital world, the timing for a reconsideration in IS 
may be right. As the digital comes to be ubiquitously woven into the fabric 
of the everyday material and embodied world, the value and meaning of 
an exclusive focus on the purely digital collapses. Everyday information 
gathering and use has become more central to IS. These issues of Library 
Trends are dedicated to exploring what IS can gain through a greater rec-
ognition of the role of the body in our field.
The bodily turn in social sciences and the humanities from the 1980s has 
been recognized as arising from a number of social and intellectual trends 
(Shilling 2007; Nettleton and Watson 1998). Jütte (2005) traces a rediscov-
ery of the senses throughout the twentieth century: the arrival of a “haptic 
age” apparent in an interest in body therapies and changing sexual mores; 
the revalorization of the sense of taste in a growing culinary pluralism; 
and the increasing cultural significance of sound through the centrality of 
music within popular culture. There is clearly a link to consumer culture: 
marketing often focuses on the sensual and affective appeal of a product 
on the assumption that this bypasses reasoned choice (Howes and Classen 
2014). Equally, the 1960s reaction against consumerism included various 
movements exploring new experiences of the body, e.g., through diet and 
exercise or even through experimenting with drugs. The body is central 
to the modern project of reflexive identity (Shilling 2007). The greying 
of the population, increasing experiences of living with chronic health 
conditions, new perspectives on disability, and new medical technologies 
have all brought into question our assumptions about the body. Another 
very important strand in the rethinking of the body is how second-wave 
feminism has challenged the gendered constructions of the body underly-
ing patriarchy, with its links to definitions of sexuality and race. As such, a 
renewed focus on the body is an important critical turn.
However, not all social currents point toward a greater importance be-
ing given to the body. For example, the shift in the character of work in 
Western societies away from manual and craft labor toward “knowledge 
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work” is a major reason why the body might be considered to be of de-
creasing theoretical importance. Similarly, the rise of the digital seems to 
reinforce disembodiment. These two trends are specifically central for IS’s 
on-going blindness to the body.
Furthermore, within a retheorization of the body, there are a number 
of very divergent intellectual currents (Gärtner 2013). Often the concern 
has primarily been with the way the body is shaped and controlled by 
structures of power, but embodied being and sensory experience have 
been neglected (Vannini, Waskul, and Gottschalk 2012; Hockey and Allen-
Collinson 2009). Foucault’s thought has been an obvious influence on this 
emphasis. A further “sensory turn” would move away from the “inscribed 
socialised (passive) body” and do “justice to its active, sensuous, produc-
tive nature,” recognizing the body as “a feeling, thinking, desiring, willing, 
vital, material agent” (O’Loughlin 2006, 10, 6, 11). 
These special issues of Library Trends bring together work by IS scholars 
who are beginning to explore the productive role of the body in informa-
tion activities. They come from a variety of metatheoretical and method-
ological traditions; encompass a wide range of study settings; and often 
explore new methods. This introduction analyzes some of the wider intel-
lectual context for their work, without attempting to do so comprehen-
sively. It seeks to chart the linkages and discontinuities between some of 
the major influences that are shaping this bodily and sensory turn, and to 
map at a high level what may be a gathering influence on IS.
The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty
An important reference point for any revaluation of the body and its re-
lation to the mind is the work of the French twentieth-century phenom-
enological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology is a 
philosophical movement concerned with the study of how phenomena 
appear to us: the structure and nature of consciousness. A complex body 
of thought, it has a number of strands or “trails” (Allen-Collinson 2009; 
Cibangu and Hepworth 2016). Allen-Collinson (2009) positions Merleau-
Ponty within existential phenomenology, the branch concerned with what 
it is to be human; Cibangu and Hepworth (2016) locate him in a tradition 
of embodied phenomenology.
For Merleau-Ponty (2012) in Phenomenology of Perception, his major work 
originally published at the end of the second world war, perception is not 
the passive receipt of atomistic sensory signals (as often pictured in cogni-
tive psychology); rather, it is a process of active intentional interpreting 
(Romdenh-Romluc 2011a). Our attention to the world is directed to do-
ing something in a particular situation. We perceive the world as opportu-
nities to act (an idea Merleau Ponty took from Gestalt psychology). This 
is not necessarily conscious intention: Merleau-Ponty is concerned with 
a prereflective motor intentionality. Such potential actions are implicitly 
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defined by one’s body in relation to an object, not just by the objects them-
selves. Thus, how one sees a chair, as something to sit on, is influenced 
by the nature of the human body shape, for which sitting is a relevant 
action. “What a perceiver sees on any particular occasion is the result of 
what she can do” (Romdenh-Romluc 2011a, 108). Since perceptions are 
opportunities to act, and actions bodily, the subject of perception/action 
is embodied. The term the “lived body” refers to the notion that we are 
a body, rather than that we “have” one. It also follows that people (and 
other beings) can see the same thing differently. Since perception is inter-
active and linked to action, there is not an objective, correct perception of 
an object. Rather, Merleau-Ponty proposes the notion of “maximum grip” 
as a positioning of an optimal relation between perceiver and perceived 
object. He suggest that one feels a tension until one has moved into this 
position of maximum grip, and then, when one has found the right place, 
one attains a sense of equilibrium. “Flow” is skilled positioning.
Once a motor skill has been learned, the body knows it and can act ap-
propriately without thought (Romdenh-Romluc 2011a). This is not mere 
habit, marked by unthinking repetition of the same action; it is a “dynamic 
trait” that is adjusted appropriately to the context (Annas 2012, 102). It is 
“practical expertise” (Annas 2012, 103).
According to Merleau-Ponty, in everyday, absorbed, skillful coping, 
acting is experienced as a steady flow of skillful activity in response 
to one’s sense of the situation. Part of that experience is a sense that 
when one’s situation deviates from some optimal body-environment re-
lationship, one’s motion takes one closer to that optimum and thereby 
relieves the “tension” of the deviation. One does not need a goal or 
intention to act. One’s body is simply solicited by the situation to get 
into equilibrium with it. (Dreyfus 1996).
To illustrate this, Dreyfus (1996) quotes a basketball player reflecting that 
often it is only after playing the ball that he realizes consciously that he 
has acted. In this view the body rather than the mind is the primary site of 
knowing about the world. The body knows. The typist has “knowledge in 
the hands” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, quoted in Romdenh-Romluc 2011b, 82). 
One can know how to do things without being able to state the principles 
that underlie them; equally one can state the principles without being able 
to know how to actually do the activity (Keat 1982). We have a nonrepre-
sentational, nonpropositional, prelinguistic experience of the world. 
Some aspects of this are familiar in IS through the notion of tacit knowl-
edge. But since for Merleau-Ponty our experience of the world is primarily 
embodied, the central concern in IS with codification of tacit knowledge 
seems misdirected. For Merleau-Ponty, the embodiment of the subject is 
core and human life is fundamentally corporeal. O’Loughlin (2006, 12) 
suggests that “reasoning and cognition are in fact specialised functions of 
our basic bodily ‘drives’ distilled and refined over time.” This would seem 
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to justify giving emphasis to the way the body itself takes on and uses in-
formation—a less exclusive focus on self-conscious information gathering.
Influentially, Merleau-Ponty also sees sensory experiences as integrated, 
and affect as part of perception. Thus, we experience the senses in a holis-
tic way, not as a series of discrete signals (Romdenh-Romluc 2011b). When 
a dog barks, we see a barking dog, not an image of a dog opening and shut-
ting its mouth and separately some sounds. We also directly perceive the 
barking dog as frightening. We do not somehow process the information 
and draw a deduction that the combination of signals indicates a threat 
(Romdenh-Romluc 2011a). 
Merleau-Ponty’s arguments are referenced widely across literatures of 
the body. Inevitably, they are not without their problems. Howes and Clas-
sen (2014) mock the wordiness of phenomenology, which purports to be 
about human fleshly experience but ends up expressed in long-winded 
textual accounts. Critically, its method of reflecting on individual subjec-
tivity potentially neglects how cultural influences might shape such ex-
periences. Thus, some of Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of experience 
neglects modalities of perception that were arguably less available to him 
as a male, e.g., experiences of vulnerability (Keat 1982). However, there 
have been applications of phenomenology in general by later authors that 
acknowledge bodies as “socially- and historically-located, socially related 
and interacting from particular structural standpoints” (Allen-Collinson 
2009).
The relevance of phenomenology as a whole to IS is summarized by 
Budd (2005) and Cibangu and Hepworth (2016)—though these accounts 
do not give much weight to Merleau-Ponty because there are more obvi-
ously relevant approaches to the study of documents (Trace 2017). Yet, 
in re-evaluations of the role of the body, Merleau-Ponty’s influence is per-
vasive, and he is an important influence on the authors in this special 
issue. It prompts us to place the body as central to human experience, 
and so also information activities; it breaks down the separation of cogni-
tion, motive, perception, and emotion; it recognizes the importance of 
the knowledge the body itself has. The gap between this and the typically 
rationalistic models of information seeking we are used to using seem to 
demand a rethinking of our assumptions in IS.
Practice Theory 
Another potential starting point for revising our understanding of the role 
of the body is practice theory. The centrality of the body for practice theo-
rists is clear from Schatzki’s (2002, 72) definition of practices as “bodily 
doings and sayings” or Reckwitz’s (2002, 251) description of them as “rou-
tinized bodily activities . . . regular skillful performance of (human) bod-
ies . . . mental and emotional activities which are——on a certain level—
bodily as well.” But if practice theory does recognize the importance of 
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the body in a general way, there is typically a lack of detail about what this 
means in its theorizing, as a number of authors have pointed out (e.g., 
Maller 2017; Yakhlef 2010; Gärtner 2011). Practice theory’s emphasis is 
often on such matters as the social nature of learning or on the active 
character of artefacts in the context of materiality, rather than on the lived 
body. Thus, in a major work such as The Site of the Social, Schatzki (2002) 
says little specific about the embodied; it is not greatly differentiated from 
other materiality (though see Schatzki 1996). Nicolini’s (2013) compre-
hensive summary of practice theories, similarly, reveals that artefacts have 
been a lot more of interest than sensing or knowing bodies.
Some notable exceptions to this relative neglect or lack of detail among 
practice theorists are in the work of Bourdieu, and also in some later au-
thors, such as Strati and Yakhlef. One of Bourdieu’s most important con-
cepts is habitus: deeply internalized, durable, motivational thought struc-
tures derived from wider social (class) structures that are dispositions that 
shape individual action (Throop and Murphy 2002). Body hexis is Bour-
dieu’s term for where these structures are written onto bodies (Throop 
and Murphy 2002). Habitus is linked to the routinization of behavior and 
tacit knowledge, though such knowledge is probably tacit because it never 
was conscious knowledge. What makes habitus such an interesting idea is 
the way that social assumptions are inscribed onto bodies or internalized 
into minds, creating apparently spontaneous responses, as the influences 
on us disappear from view as bodily habits and commonsense assump-
tions. But the problem here for modern sensibilities is that habitus as thus 
conceived could be seen as rather deterministic, static, and outside con-
sciousness (Noble and Watkins 2003). It lacks a sense of the complex way 
habitus shapes action, how it can change and also be actively reflected 
upon. Illustrating this critique through the learning of sporting skills, No-
ble and Watkins (2003) suggest Bourdieu mistakes a growing automaticity 
through habituation, with lack of access to consciousness. In that sense, 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the routinization of practical expertise is prob-
ably more attractive.
A number of later authors within the practice tradition have drawn on 
Merleau-Ponty to say more about the role of the body in knowledge, no-
tably Strati (2007) and Yakhlef (2010). Strati (2007), for example, writes 
about the “sensible” nature of knowing. Showing a strong influence from 
Merleau-Ponty, he demonstrates that the body learns to know some things 
through doing rather than through reasoning. He ties this knowing to 
emotion and aesthetics. He draws on examples of how within specific prac-
tices we learn to know how to interpret certain forms of sensory data in 
very particular ways. His examples are taken from physical activity/skills 
and demonstrate what the body knows as existing as well as what the mind 
knows. A further leap is possible if, as Gärtner (2011) argues, we recog-
nize that our abstract cognitive representations might also draw on bodily 
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experience. At this point the dualism between cognition and the body 
collapses, a point developed in the next section.
Practice theory has been adopted by a number of authors in IS, but 
most notably and influentially by Lloyd (2009, 2010). Lloyd (2010) em-
phasizes the importance of the body in information literacy, again drawing 
on Merleau-Ponty, among other influences. 
Her empirical work reveals the importance of learning to interpret in-
formation from the different senses to achieve competence in practices 
such as ambulance work (Lloyd 2009). Skills learned in the classroom or 
through reading texts need to be translated to embodied understanding. 
In the field it is vital that the practitioner acquires an understanding for 
the subtle sensory information that helps interpret the situation. She also 
points to the way patterns of practice inscribed on bodies can be read by 
others as a source of information. In identifying corporeal information 
as an important modality of information, and exploring its dynamic rela-
tion in learning to textual and social modalities of information, she has 
produced what is already an influential framework for examining informa-
tion landscapes and competencies within practices (Lloyd 2009). Several 
authors in this collection in Library Trends take Lloyd’s work as a starting 
point.
Embodied Cognition 
Somewhat influenced by Merleau-Ponty, as well as other strands of phil-
osophical thinking (Leitan and Chaffey 2014), another important area 
of work reevaluating the importance of the body is around the notion 
of “embodied cognition,” which is being developed in the fields of the 
philosophy of the mind, cognitive science, but also artificial intelligence, 
neuroscience, and linguistics. Traditionally, reasoning was often seen as 
happening in a centralized way in the brain, working at an abstract level, 
consciously, through language, and rather removed from the processes of 
immediate perception. Embodied cognition represents a range of work 
that in contrast points to the way that parts of the body other than the 
brain are involved in cognition and working at an unconscious level and 
are bound up with perception, movement, and action. Thus the “Embodi-
ment Thesis” is that “many features of cognition are embodied in that 
they are deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of 
an agent, such that the agent’s beyond-the-brain body plays a significant 
causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent’s cognitive pro-
cessing” (Wilson and Foglia 2016). It is one of a number of interrelated 
theories that challenge the notion that cognition happens purely in the 
brain. 
One form of the thesis refers to the way we think by actively engaging 
with the world. So we do not think separately from the state of our body. 
Experimental examples show that responses to a question differ depend-
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ing on what physical tasks the body is performing when the question is 
posed. For example, evaluations of something are more positive if we are 
asked to do the evaluation while pushing upwards on a table (Robbins 
and Aydede 2009). Thus, in real time the rest of our body beyond our 
brain is involved in thinking. Gestural cognition refers to the way that our 
physical gestures while talking and thinking are part of our thought (John-
son 2017). Gesture is not solely about communicating ideas to others; it 
would appear it is an active part of the cognitive process (Goldin-Meadow 
1999; Pouw et al. 2014). This is one example of the way that thinking, 
rather than being centralized in the brain, is distributed around the body. 
It works partly unconsciously, and not just through symbolic systems. The 
characteristics and capabilities of the body thus shape reasoning.
Even more fundamental is the notion that the representations used in 
mental cognition are ultimately grounded in our embodied experience of 
the world. A key source of this idea are Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) 
claims that bodily metaphors underlie most reasoning (“embodied real-
ism”). Margaret Wilson (2002) sees this as the least discussed but poten-
tially most powerful version of the notion of embodied cognition, for it as-
serts that the concepts we use in abstract thinking are actually founded on 
bodily experience. Abstract concepts are understood through metaphors 
of embodied experience, and so are based on how we as humans interact 
with the environment. For example, our abstract understanding of the 
concept of balance, or equilibrium, ultimately is as a metaphor drawing on 
the physical experience of balancing our body (Gärtner 2011). This claim 
solves the longstanding philosophical conundrum of how it is possible 
that we can attach meaning to mental representations, by suggesting that 
we derive them from our bodily understanding of things (Robbins and 
Aydede 2009). Thus, while much of the work from Merleau-Ponty is about 
motor skills, here all the workings of cognition, including high-order ab-
stract reasoning, are seen to be founded on bodily experience. Such a view 
should have a radical impact on how we view mental thought processes, 
including those implicated in information.
Embodied cognition is one of a number of theoretical strands that chal-
lenge the view that cognition happens purely in the brain, such as embed-
ded and extended (or distributed) cognition, and which collectively are 
sometimes labelled situated cognition. Embedded cognition suggests that 
cognitive activity cannot be understood separately from the given struc-
tures of the physical or social environment. We partly think by offloading 
some of the effort onto the environment. Examples of these are epistemic 
actions, which are actions that help someone think about a problem (Rob-
bins and Aydede 2009). For example, in trying to pack a suitcase, orga-
nizing items in some sort of order on the floor helps work out how to 
fit them in, rather than trying to work out how to organize them purely 
in one’s mind. The notion of extended cognition suggests that thinking 
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involves things beyond the individual organism, including others: socially 
distributed cognition (Hollan, Hutchins, and Kirsh 2000). The cognitive 
process of navigating a ship is coordinated across a number of individuals 
and tools, rather than happening within an individual mind. Collectively, 
embodied, embedded, and extended cognition are sometimes referred 
to as situated cognition. By virtue of their embodied, embedded, and ex-
tended nature, cognitive processes are dependent on the situation. We 
might have different thought processes depending on our bodily/other 
situation: consider, for example, moving around a room to think about 
how the furniture might be laid out.
In the light of the notion of embodied cognition, IS’s relative neglect of 
the body seems increasingly problematic. Some of the work in the area of 
situated and distributed cognition will be familiar to those working in IS, 
e.g., through the work of authors such as Suchman (1987), Lave (1988), 
and Hutchins (1995). Collectively, it seems to offer an interesting perspec-
tive on the context of information behavior. Another area where these 
theories have had a marked influence in the broad field of IS is in the un-
derstanding of the embodied aspects of reading (McLaughlin 2016) and 
especially how reading changes when digital devices replace the printed 
book (Glenberg 2011; Mangen 2008, 2014; Mangen and Schilhab 2012). 
Lueg (2014, 2015) is one of the few authors who have begun to directly 
think through the implications of embodied cognition for information 
behavior. He draws out how information experience is affected by the 
fact that human bodies are different from each other. Even something as 
simple as body height impacts what is perceived. Our perceptions are also 
influenced by the situation, including the task. Some sensory information 
is simply ignored. The peculiarities of the processes of perception need to 
be considered in how people gather information.
The implications of embodied cognition are profound; for example, 
consider the importance of the body to learning (Rambusch and Ziemke 
2005). We learn through movement and gesture. Many authors have 
noted the way that walking changes thought patterns and aids creativity 
(Clughen 2014; Keinänen 2016). Learning may be enhanced by certain 
physical practices that promote bodily awareness (Claxton 2015). This 
suggests the body and its movement are likely to be integral to collect-
ing and interpreting information. In turn this could impact our view of 
how space as part of the environment shapes information use, as it does 
reading and learning. Different spaces engender different styles of read-
ing (McLaughlin 2016). For example, the sensory experience of libraries 
is central to their role as places to read and undertake other informal 
learning tasks (Cox 2017). Indeed, from this perspective the embodied 
nature of learning is as applicable to traditional academic tasks and the 
traditional domains of information literacy as it is to the context of profes-
sional practice so emphasized by Lloyd.
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Sensory Studies 
Gärtner (2011) offers a useful recent synthesis of the thought of Merleau-
Ponty, practice theory, and embodied cognition. Nevertheless, his account 
of bodily experience remains at a high level of abstraction. An alternative 
starting point might be sensory studies: “a cultural approach to the study 
of the senses and a sensory approach to the study of culture” (Howes 
2013b). In contrast to the mainstream treatment of perception in psychol-
ogy that focuses on descriptions of supposedly universal mechanisms by 
which sensory information is processed, sensory studies reveals how in 
different societies different meanings are attached to the senses and the 
cultural significance of the way that the senses are placed in different posi-
tions in a hierarchy of importance. 
The roots of sensory studies lie in a sensory turn in history and social 
anthropology in the 1980s and 1990s, though the term was not coined un-
til 2006, associated with the founding of the journal The Senses and Society. 
Among historians it can be traced back to scholars in the Annales school, 
in particular to the work of Alain Corbin, and has been notably taken 
forward by Constance Classen (1993, 2014). Now there is a substantial 
body of historical work sharing these preoccupations, as reviewed by such 
authors such as Jütte (2005) and Smith (2007) and in the six volume Cul-
tural History of the Senses, edited by Classen (2014). Sensory anthropology 
emerged at the same time, challenging the tendency to overemphasize 
cultures as texts. Anthropologists have explored the way different cultures 
attach different meanings and value to sensations such as smell, balance, 
hearing, or heat (Classen 1993; Howes and Classen 2014). The method of 
“participant sensation” displaces participant observation’s privileging of 
sight (Howes 2013a). Subsequently these interests have been picked up in 
other fields, such as geography and sociology (Howes 2013a).
The Sensory Formations series of monographs—which are interdisci-
plinary anthologies on such topics as auditory cultures (Bull, Back, and 
Howes 2015), smell culture (Drobnick 2006), and touch (Classen 2005)—
are a useful entry point to this perspective on the study of the senses. 
Without universalizing how these senses are experienced (or indeed how 
they are differentiated and named), they explore the range of meanings 
attached to particular sensory experiences in different historical and cul-
tural settings. Porteus’s (2006) analysis of smellscapes, reprinted in Drob-
nick (2006), for example, captures certain unique features of the sense, 
such as the difficulty of locating smell, but also the variation in its meaning 
in different spaces and time. Such richness is lacking in the philosophi-
cal generalizations of phenomenology. It also challenges psychological 
explanations of perception or our tendency to interpret these sensations 
as purely private, subjective experiences. Rather, these readings sensitize 
us to the precise cultural meanings attached to the senses in different 
contexts, and challenge the privileging of the visual as a means of know-
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ing. Such exploration of the meaning of the senses is important to IS if 
ultimately the senses are an immediate, essential, if mundane source of 
information.
The title of Howes and Classen’s (2014) introductory text, Ways of Sens-
ing, refers to the plural ways in which senses as processes are experienced 
across societies and contexts. A central tenet of sensory studies is that it 
challenges the traditional categorization of five senses. There are differ-
ent categorizations at different historical periods or in different societies 
(Howes 2013b). For example, the very dimensions of touch or the haptic 
are multiple. Touching with hands is different from touching with other 
parts of the body, and also might not necessarily be differentiated from 
senses of the internal organs. Thus the very categorization of the senses we 
take for granted is a cultural construct. The relation and interplay between 
the senses, “intersensoriality,” is also important for these authors (Howes 
2013b), as it was for Merleau-Ponty. The senses can be arranged “a) more 
or less synergetically, b) more or less hierarchically, and c) more or less in-
terconnectedly” or d) more or less simultaneously or sequentially. Senses 
can collaborate but may also conflict (Howes 2013b). Exploring how 
meaning exists relationally between the senses is central to such studies. 
Another central concern is how the social ranking of the senses is 
linked to structures of power in society: “Every ordering of the senses is 
at the same time a social ordering” (Howes 2013b). Usually higher so-
cial groups become symbolically associated with what are deemed higher 
senses. Marginal groups resist such ordering. For example, Smith (2007) 
charts the changing meaning of touch in Western societies. Historically, 
touch has often been seen as a means of authentic access to knowledge. 
But there was a gradual denigration of the sense in the Enlightenment, 
as touch became associated with disease and the “base” drive of sexuality. 
Sight became increasingly associated with reason, detachment, objectivity; 
touch with instinct. There were strong links between this sensory order 
and patriarchy (e.g., through medical practices), class divisions, and the 
racist assumptions underlying imperialism. But these are not necessary 
associations. Indeed, something as close to reasoning as writing is itself 
tactile in nature (Classen 2005). Thus, in examining the experience of 
the senses, we need to have a critical awareness of the power structures 
that shape them.
Indeed, a central debate in the field has been around the proposition 
that historical and cross-cultural comparisons reveal an “ocularcentrism”—
a privileging of the visual—in Western thinking. McLuhan and Ong 
thought that shifts in communication media had made a major impact on 
the experience of the senses, creating a deeply significant split between 
oral societies, privileging speech, and visual societies, privileging the 
printed word (Smith 2007). Hence printed text comes to be linked to vi-
sion and to reason, objectivity. This “Great Divide” thesis now appears too 
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simplistic a binary, but has structured much of the debate (Smith 2007). 
There may be many practices of looking; not all are modelled on detached 
observation. 
The text-based methods of historical scholars could well have value in 
reconstructing the meaning of the relation of the information and the 
senses for IS. Some have been critical, however, of the way Howes sees the 
senses as essentially culturally formed with little room for individuality and 
creativity (Pink 2015).
If we are more concerned with contemporary sensory order, Vannini, 
Waskul, and Gottschalk (2012) offer a more sociological account of sen-
sory studies. They coin a number of terms that provide a useful lexicon for 
those working in the field (2012), including the following:
•	 Somatic	work: “the range of linguistic and alinguistic reflexive experiences 
and activities by which individuals interpret, create, extinguish, maintain, 
interrupt, and/or communicate somatic sensations that are congruent 
with personal, interpersonal, and/or cultural notions of moral, aesthetic, 
and/or logical desirability” (19). On the surface this concept is quite 
hard to understand, but it emphasizes the active nature of the senses 
as well as the combination of prelinguistic and cultural elements that 
make up sensory experience. The notion that the “senses are skills” is 
a helpful way into this (15).
•	 Sensory	order or the sensorium (59): a cultural model of the meaning of 
the senses. We have already seen this in the work of Classen and Howes, 
but what Vannini, Waskul, and Gottschalk add is that this can exist at 
the level of a whole civilization, one society or a small group, like their 
example of wine-tasters. Perhaps within specific practices the senses are 
experienced differently. That is the logic of Grasseni (2009), who writes 
about how the senses are trained, e.g., in farming communities in the 
Alps. A community of practice could be a sensory community; a land-
scape of practice could be a sensory landscape.
•	 Sensory	communities: “groups of people who share common ways of using 
their senses and making sense of their senses” (7).
•	 Sensory	socialization (49): the way one would learn the meaning attached 
to sensory experiences in a particular context.
•	 Sensuous	 self: “a performative, reflexive, perceptive, intentional, inde-
terminate, emergent, embodied being-in-the-world” (85). This con-
cept refers to the way sense of self emerges from sensory experiences, 
shaped within a wider culture.
•	 Somatic	career (85): the history or biography of sensuous experiences that 
constitute an important aspect of identity and is tied to the sensuous 
self.
As yet there have been few authors who have borrowed from this body 
of theory for IS. Yet there is significant potential in Vannini, Waskul, and 
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Gottschalk’s (2012) terminology to inspire a much closer investigation of 
the precise meaning and interrelation of the meaning of sensory informa-
tion in particular contexts, communities, and practices, and how these 
relate to wider cultural identities.
Vanini, Waskul, and Gottschalk call for a “sensuous scholarship” (a 
term first used by Stoller [1997]): for research about, through, and for 
the senses (Vannini, Waskul, and Gottschalk 2012, 63). This implies the 
use of new methods to examine the senses, as well as the investigation of 
new types of activities. This is challenging given the ephemeral, uncon-
scious, and tacit qualities of much sensory experience (Borer 2013). Pink’s 
(2015) Doing Sensory Ethnography is an influential guide to such methods. 
Interviewing and observation may still be important within such research 
practices. However, it might not be simply an interview taking place out-
side the context of interest; thus, practices such as interviewers walking 
with participants could be valuable data-collection tools to explore sound-
scapes, smellscapes, and touchscapes (Borer 2013). Interviews could well 
involve elicitation, using photos or drawing (methods already of interest 
in IS [Hartel 2014]) but also potentially sounds or smells (Pink 2015). It 
is probably important to engage all the senses, given the intersensoriality 
of experience (Mason and Davies 2009). Participant-produced video and 
journaling have also been used. In terms of participant observation, auto-
ethnographic methods could be important, but the researcher may also 
need to take a “sensory apprenticeship” into the sensorium of a particu-
lar sensory community (Pink 2015). The sensory focus also implies new 
ways of presenting research outputs, be that through exhibitions, olfactory 
books, or guided walks (Pink 2015).
Conclusion
A number of very different streams of thought are flowing together to 
influence how the body is seen (Gärtner 2013). This review has attempted 
to chart some of these, helping to map them out for readers. It has been 
far from comprehensive. There are many other potential influences from 
educational theorists such as Dewey through to feminist and critical the-
ory. All prompt us to consider further the role of the body in information 
activities. Fully exploring the ramifications of these influences on informa-
tion theory promises to be a rich area of work for some years. It is to be 
hoped that the collection of papers in this double issue will be a landmark 
in further stimulating such work.
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